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THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE: IS MARKET-ORIENTED 
REFORM PRODUCING A “TWO-TRACK” EUROPE? 
Abstract 
The European Commission has formally recognised that adequate provision of basic 
household services, including energy, communications, water and transport, is key to ensuring 
equity, social cohesion and solidarity. And yet little research has been done on the impact of 
the reform of these services in this regard. This paper offers an innovative way to explore 
such questions by analysing and contrasting stated and revealed preferences on citizen 
satisfaction with and expenditure on two services, electricity and telecommunications, in two 
large European countries, Spain and the United Kingdom. In telecommunications, but much 
less so in electricity, we find evidence that reform has led to a “two-track” Europe, where 
citizens who are elderly, not working or the less-educated behave differently in the market, 
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THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE: IS MARKET-ORIENTED 
REFORM PRODUCING A “TWO-TRACK” EUROPE? 
1. Introduction 
Public infrastructure services - such as electricity and gas, water, communications and public 
transportation - experienced an extended period of stability in their modes of organization and 
regulation in Western European countries from around the end of World War II to the late 
1970s (Millward 2005). During this period, the dominance of public ownership of these 
sectors was justified by arguments about the existence of market failures (in particular, 
natural monopolies), the strategic and economic importance of many of the services, as well 
as concerns about social justice (Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2004, Van de Walle 2009). Public 
ownership helped act as a regulatory mechanism to resolve the conflict of interest between 
investors and consumers (Newbery 2004). However, from the late 1970s onwards, these 
services were subjected to deep reform. In the context of the European Union, this reform 
intensified sharply during the 1990s, particularly due to processes of market integration and 
liberalization policies in these sectors (Bauby 2008, Bognetti and Obermann 2008). In 
parallel, Member States embarked upon the privatization of many of these services. 
 
Reform of public infrastructure services, particularly liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization, was founded on neoclassical economic theory which rested on two critical sets 
of assumptions. Firstly, it assumed that exposing firms to competition would result in lower 
prices and increased service choice for consumers. Both from the theoretical perspective 
(Armstrong and Sappington 2006) as well as ex-post empirical analysis of price and choice 
(Fiorio and Florio 2009), it has been shown that these reforms did not necessarily always 
deliver the promised results. Secondly - and more importantly for this paper – it was assumed 
that citizens, cast as rational consumers, would be positioned to benefit universally from these 
developments (EC 2004). From the outset of reform, however, concern had been expressed by 
some agents about whether, under market-driven rules, traditions of public service obligations 
and universal access would be undermined, and that citizens’ would end up receiving lower 
quality services (CEEP and ETUC 2000). Pressure was placed upon the European 
Commission (EC) to guarantee certain service standards, in the form of a directive or citizens’ 
charter: after a series of consultations, communications and white papers, the EC officially 
recognized in a protocol of the Treaty of Lisbon that “Services of General Interest” were key 
to the upholding of social and territorial cohesion, strengthening solidarity and equity, thus 
preserving values such as universal access, affordability, quality and continuity were stated to 
be priorities (EC 2007a).  
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Now, despite the fact that reform was implemented in the name of the consumer, relatively 
little effort went into evaluating these reforms from the citizen, or even, the consumer, 
perspective (Fiorio and Florio 2008, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2010). This relative neglect has 
started to change recently, spurred by two main developments. Firstly, the EC has officially 
recognized that problems remain in making the market work, particular, in these 
infrastructure services (Dierx et al., forthcoming). Secondly, policy-makers have become 
interested in how theoretical insights borrowed from behavioral economics might be applied 
to improving ongoing reform by better understanding consumer behavior. Interest in 
behavioral economics by policy-makers started among the Anglo-Saxon oriented institutions, 
including the Australian Government (2007), the Federal Trade Commission (2007), the 
British Institute for Government (2010), as well as the OECD (2008 and 2010).
1
 From there, 
ideas were diffused to the EC, which became interested in how these insights could be used to 
improve public infrastructure regulation, in order to make the market work more efficiently 
whilst improving citizen well-being and satisfaction (EC 2008a and 2010). This new 
approach, moreover, was mooted as being able to help to develop policies to address 




In this light, the objective of this paper is to evaluate public infrastructure regulation from the 
perspective of citizens as consumers, focusing particularly on consequences for equity and 
social cohesion. In order to examine how socio-economic differences affect expenditure and 
satisfaction, the analysis focuses on the decisions and attitudes of those potentially becoming 
“vulnerable consumers” through their belonging to three dimensions: those who do not work; 
the elderly; and/or the less-educated. We focus on two major infrastructure services where 
reforms have been particularly intense, telecommunications and electricity, and consider two 
large European countries where reform is advanced, the United Kingdom (UK), reform 
pioneer in the European context, and Spain, which also implemented deep reforms, albeit 
later, during the 1990s. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section sketches the extent of 
reform of telecommunications and electricity in the UK and Spain before explaining how 
behavioral economics and its insights could be applied in an effort to better understanding 
                                                     
1
 On the argument the OECD was born and fundamentally remains an Anglo-Saxon institution, see 
Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes (2011). 
2
  The concept of “vulnerable consumers” generally refers to citizens who, as consumers, are perceived 
as being more likely to find process of market learning more complex due to spatial, inter-generational, 
financial and social reasons. See Burden (1998), OECD (2008) and Hogg, Howells and Milman (2007). 
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consumer behavior in these markets. The third section presents the data used and the 
methodology. Next, an empirical examination is conducted of the impact of socio-economic 
dimensions that have been associated with greater consumer vulnerability, through 
contrasting stated preferences (dissatisfaction with price) and revealed preferences (spending 
decisions), in the fourth section. Finally, in the conclusions, findings are presented, together 
with conclusions and future research questions.  
2. Rethinking public infrastructure regulation 
2.1 Reforming public infrastructure in the UK and Spain 
The UK and Spain represent two major European economies where reforms in the 
telecommunications and electricity sectors were intense and far-reaching. The UK was the 
reform pioneer in Europe; Margaret Thatcher set into motion an ambitious programme 
including liberalization, deregulation and privatization from the 1980s (Florio 2004). Intense 
reform of these sectors in Spain followed, during the 1990s, responding in particular to the 
requirements of the EC liberalization directives (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2006 and 
2007, Dubois and Saplacan 2010). Across Europe, reform came earlier and deeper in 
telecommunications than in electricity (Bance 2007). In both countries, telecommunications 
reform resulted in total privatization and full legal liberalization of the sector. In practice, 
however, the former incumbents in both countries still enjoy high market concentration, 
particularly in Spain, distorting competition (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes, 2011). In the 
electricity sector, both countries implemented full entry liberalization and unbundling. In the 
UK, privatization was total, whereas, in Spain, it was deep, though electricity transmission 
remains in the public sector. Whilst competition has generally been introduced in the UK, the 
Spanish market has remained dominated by private regional monopolies
3
 (CEEP 2010). 
Rather than full withdrawal from these services, the State took on the role as market regulator 
and supervisor (Majone 1996) assuming overall responsibility for preserving citizens’ rights 
as consumers to those services considered in the general interest. In Spain, the functioning of 
these markets is subject to legally-established public service obligations, which mainly refer 
to guaranteeing service universality and security of supply (CEEP 2010). In contrast, in the 
UK, citizens’ rights as consumers are not enshrined in a specific legal document, and there 
was confidence that these issues could be resolved by the market (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-
Fuentes 2005).  
                                                     
3 RD 485/2009 and RD-Ley 6/2009 require, from 1 July 2009, that the Spanish electricity sector is 
open to competition. However, these changes have not yet had an impact on market performance. 
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2.2 The challenge from behavioural economics 
Through its competence in delivering the Single Market, the EC has substantial powers to 
implement bold reform across public infrastructure services such as telecommunications and 
electricity. These policies, based on a supply-side perspective, had as key objectives the 
promotion of market integration and the subsequent opening up to competition (Pelkmans 
2006). Following conventional neoclassical economic theory, citizens, recast as consumers, 
were conceptualized as homo oeconomicus, meaning that they were assumed to be 
homogeneous, rational agents who would maximize their individual utility. As such, EC 
policy-makers assumed that benefits of introducing competition could be shared in similar 
ways by all (EC 2004). 
 
Behavioral economics, a newly emerging discipline, challenged this conception of rational, 
selfish individuals. This school was, in turn, influenced by the institutionalist school, which 
had traditionally constituted the main alternative to the conventional neoclassical approach 
(Hodgson 1998). Institutionalism conceives individuals not as isolated elements, but as 
agents, whose behavior can be largely explained by their position in the social environment 
and by the socio-economic institutions around them, including interaction between 
individuals, the existence of common concepts, norms, values and customs (Wilbur and 
Harrison 1978, Hodgson 2000).  
 
Whilst still maintaining many similarities with neoclassical economics, behavioral economics 
shares two core aspects with institutionalism: it incorporates insights from other scientific 
disciplines, particularly psychology; and it foregrounds the empirical reality of agents’ 
behavior, rather than resting principally on theoretical formalizations (Berg 2010). On these 
grounds, the existence of biases that may condition individual behavior are identified such as 
“bounded rationality”, because of overconfidence, inertia, extrapolation error or loss aversion, 
and “limited selfishness”, due to altruism, cooperation or inequality aversion (Mullainathan 
and Thaler 2000). Insights from behavioral economics can be particularly interesting when 
analyzing situations in which individuals’ decisions do not lead to their optimizing their 
situation. A case in point is that the benefits of competition may not occur when consumers 
do not behave in perfectly rational and do not enjoy perfect information (Gans 2005). 
Kahneman and Thaler (2006) distinguished between a “decision utility”, on which agents 
base their choices, and “experienced utility”, referring to the results obtained from these 
decisions. Combining insights from behavioral economics on bounded rationality and limited 
selfishness with institutionalists’ analysis of how the social environment influences 
consumers’ behavior, it could be derived that consumers will take heterogeneous decisions, 
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and that not all consumers have the same capabilities to make consumption choices that lead 
them to maximize their own satisfaction.  
 
To date, the evaluation of public infrastructure reform and regulation has scarcely applied 
these concepts. However, as Ceriani, Doronzo and Florio (2009) observed, analyzing 
consumer heterogeneity could be particularly useful in these sectors, due to ease of 
implementing price discriminations, and multiple uses of services, leading to very different 
demand elasticities. The EC (2008a and 2010) has already started to show an interest in the 
possibilities of behavioral economics for future improved implementation of the Single 
Market. At best, they envisage that a better understanding of citizens as consumers in the 
marketplace might help the formulation of specific, targeted consumer policies to facilitate 
certain categories of citizens take better consumption decisions (EC 2008b, OECD 2008). 
3. Data and Methodology 
There are two main empirical sources at hand when seeking to examine choices and attitudes 
of individuals when consuming public services: revealed preferences, information on 
observable choices made by individuals; and stated preferences, derived from subjective 
expressions of satisfaction with public services, based on opinions (Frei and Stutzer 2002). 
Both options, taken alone, have various limitations, which have led to a debate about which is 
the best suited method of analyzing individual and social welfare. This article uses an 
innovative approach of using revealed and stated preferences together, as complementary 
sources, to evaluate reform in these sectors, as suggested by Fiorio and Florio (2008). This 
approach has already been successfully applied in other fields (Köszegi and Rabin 2008, 
Whitehead et al. 2008), but it has scarcely been applied to the evaluation of public 
infrastructure services regulation from the citizens’ perspective, and what has been done to 
date is largely confined to one sector and one country (Waddams Price et al. 2007). 
 
Revealed preferences are often understood as representing objective data, so most economic 
analysis has focused on these.
4
 Most of the studies that have used revealed preferences to 
evaluate public infrastructure services regulation are based on national Household Budget 
Surveys (HBSs), essentially, surveys disaggregating household expenditure by categories. In 
Spain, studies include Arocena (2003) and Duarte, Mainar and Sánchez-Chóliz (2010); and in 
the UK, Gómez-Lobo (1996), Burns, Crawford and Dilnot (1996), Waddams Price and 
Hancock (1998) and Bennett, Cooke and Waddams Price (2002). However, taken alone, 
                                                     
4
 For an interesting debate on the objective/subjective nature of data on public sector performance, see 
the special issue edited by Van Dooren and Van de Walle (2008). 
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revealed preferences do not permit observers to analyze behavioral aspects such as why a 
service is not used, or to understand how biases identified by behavioral economists lead to 
individuals not maximizing their utility. Moreover, public infrastructure service markets are 
not competitive, but quasi-markets, so exiting and switching supplier involve high costs for 
the citizen and, thus, consumption decisions may not always reflect their real preferences. In 
this way, Hirschman’s exit-voice-loyalty framework (1970) is invoked, since voice, which 
can be evaluated using stated preferences, is also an essential element to consider. Once 
public infrastructure reform was set in motion, the EC executed Eurobarometer surveys 
specifically intended to analyze and keep a check on citizen satisfaction with these services. 
Some economic analysis, such as Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes (2005), Bacchiocchi, 
Florio and Gambaro (2008), Fiorio and Florio (2008, 2009) and Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 
(2010) have used these sources to examine citizen satisfaction with reform. The theoretical 
advantage of combining stated and revealed preferences is to maximize the contrasting 
strengths of both approaches, whilst minimizing their weaknesses, thus aiming to enrich the 
interpretation of the data (Whitehead et al. 2008: 876). 
 
The evaluation of infrastructure reform from a consumer perspective is executed by 
contrasting examinations of revealed and stated preferences: firstly, the two data sources are 
analysed separately; next, they are contrasted. The logic of the analysis follows Kahneman 
and Thaler (2006) who state that, in the decision-making process, individuals first make their 
choices, reflected in revealed spending patterns; they then obtain a degree of (dis)satisfaction 
with the price of that service, which is reflected in stated preferences. In order to derive 
hypotheses for testing, we reverse the order of these two steps to propose: 
 
1. Citizens who are more vulnerable as consumers will be more dissatisfied than other 
citizens with service prices, as a result of the spending decisions they take in the 
markets and reflecting the particular problems they encounter in these markets. 
2. Citizens who are more vulnerable as consumers make spending decisions which are 
distinct to those of other citizens. 
3. The problems of citizens who are more vulnerable as consumers in the market are 
commonly observed in both countries and sectors under analysis. 
 
Empirical analysis of the three hypotheses is addressed firstly by evaluating stated 
preferences. Sources used are the sub-samples of the micro-data for the year 2006, from 
Eurobarometer (EC 2007b). Dissatisfaction with service price is selected as the dependent 
variable, identified when the respondent states that the service is not “affordable”. In the case 
of telecommunications, information is disaggregated between fixed telephony, mobile 
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telephony and the internet (which is the least-used service of the three). Because of this, two 
variables are considered: “dissatisfaction with the price of telephony”, which refers to 
dissatisfaction with the price of fixed or mobile telephony, and “dissatisfaction with the price 
of telecommunications”, referring to dissatisfaction with the price of one of any of these three 
services. For revealed preferences, data is derived from the micro-data for 2006 from the 
British and Spanish HBSs, namely, the Expenditure and Food Survey (ONS 2006) and the 
Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (INE 2006). From the information included in these 
surveys, the logarithm of household spending on electricity and telecommunications, 
expressed in euros per year, is taken as the dependent variable. 
 
Following Burden (1998), it is assumed that there are two, sometimes, complementary, major 
reasons that citizens may be more vulnerable as consumers: firstly, because they may 
encounter greater difficulties to obtain and/or assimilate the information necessary to make 
consumption decisions; and, secondly, because they may experience a greater welfare loss 
due to inadequate consumption decisions, or for not consuming a good or service that would 
otherwise be in their interests to do. From here, Burden (1998) and OECD (2008) proceed to 
analyse vulnerable consumers by focusing on particular socio-economic characteristics of 
individuals. In this article, we select three major independent variables associated with 
citizens’ potential vulnerability in the market: employment (non-employed versus employed); 
age (the elderly versus the middle-aged and young) and education (low-educated versus 
better-educated). Control variables are household size and house ownership status and, in the 
case of revealed preferences, household income (from the equivalent total expenditure). The 
effect of each of these variables on the dependent variables is derived from a probit 
estimation, in the case of stated preferences, and from a linear estimation, in the case of 
revealed preferences. In both cases, for telecommunications and electricity, separate 
estimations are conducted for both countries, using the sampling weights provided by the 
surveys, ensuring representative results in terms of the whole population. 
 
Finally, in order to contrast the evidence obtained, as regards stated preferences, it is 
considered that dissatisfaction with service price is a direct function of two elements: the unit 
price paid (P); and a second, subjective element (V), which reflects the degree of pessimism 
in the perception, which can be derived by the respondent’s level of confidence in the market. 
For revealed preferences, spending on each service is also a direct function of the unit price 
paid (P) and, in addition, of the amount consumed (X), reflecting the degree of participation 
in the market. From the two relationships described, it becomes possible to interpret the 
effects estimated regarding the dependent variables under analysis as a result of differences in 
P, V and/or X and, thus, reflecting particular problems in the market. 
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4. Evaluating public infrastructure services from the citizens’ perspective: Results 
The estimated marginal effects of the independent variables analyzed on stated dissatisfaction 
with service price are shown in Table 1. In the case of electricity, the variables representing 
citizens’ vulnerability as consumers (employment, age and education) hardly show any 
significant effects on price dissatisfaction. In Spain, 65-year olds and over are more 
dissatisfied than others, but in the UK, dissatisfaction is independent of age. Dissatisfaction 
among the employed and non-employed is similar in both countries. In the case of education, 
there are, again, no significant differences across the two countries, with the minor exception 
of the UK where there is a weakly significant effect associated with an intermediate 
educational attainment. 
 
In contrast, in the case of telecommunications, all the variables representative of citizens’ 
vulnerability as consumers are significantly related to price dissatisfaction, independent of the 
indicator selected (price of telephony or price of telecommunications). Furthermore, all these 
effects show the same direction in both countries. So, those not employed express greater 
dissatisfaction than the employed in the UK and Spain. As regards age, there are higher 
dissatisfaction rates for the 65 year olds and over in both countries: when the results are 
disaggregated by service, the elderly are particularly dissatisfied with both mobile telephony 
and internet. Finally, educational attainment is inversely related to price dissatisfaction in 
both countries. When considering the price of telephony, those without university education 
are less satisfied than graduates. For the price of telecommunications, those who did not 
finish secondary school show particular dissatisfaction.  
 
Next we turn to examining correspondence between the estimated effects of these variables 
on revealed service expenditure. Results are shown in Table 2. Starting with expenditure on 
electricity, the control variables show significant effects in both countries. The variables 
representing citizens’ vulnerability as consumers are also related, in general, to expenditure 
on this service. Age is directly related to electricity expenditure in both countries, especially 
in the UK. Regarding employment status, households without any employed member are 
associated with higher spending in Spain, although not in the UK. Moreover, the less-
educated spend more on electricity in Spain, but less in the UK. 
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Table 1. Marginal effects estimated on dissatisfaction with electricity and 
telecommunications prices 
    Electricity Telephony Telecommunications 
    UK Spain UK Spain UK Spain 













Employment NOTEMPLOYED 0.036 -0.020 0.081** 0.107*** 0.092** 0.067* 
Age <35 0.036 -0.011 0.031 -0.046 -0.008 -0.072 
 50-64 0.007 -0.018 0.042 -0.005 0.118** -0.018 
 65-74 0.070 0.125* 0.133** 0.175*** 0.303*** 0.163*** 
  >74 -0.024 0.182** 0.295*** 0.286*** 0.445*** 0.214*** 
Education HIGHSECOND 0.049* 0.037 -0.032 -0.061 -0.067* -0.094** 
  UNIVERSITY -0.033 -0.041 -0.099** -0.129** -0.157*** -0.214*** 
Control 1PERSON 0.014 0.069 0.125*** -0.010 0.136*** 0.020 
Variables 3PERSONS 0.057 0.009 0.022 -0.105** 0.018 -0.068 
 4PERSONS 0.085* 0.093** -0.049 -0.024 -0.090 -0.063 
 >4PERSONS 0.027 0.006 0.059 -0.105* 0.026 -0.097 
  NOHOUSEPROP 0.005 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.203*** 0.166*** 0.145*** 
N  1337 1006 1337 1006 1337 1006 
Wald chi2  20.46 34.29 125.57 111.03 200.99 105.32 
Prob > chi2   0.059 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* Significance level at 10%, ** significance level at 5%, *** significance level at 1%  
Source: Own calculations based on EC (2007b). 
 
One possible explanation for this cross-country difference is that a “Social Action Strategy” 
was introduced into the UK from 2000 in order to alleviate problems of “fuel poverty” even 
though Bennett, Cooke and Waddams Price (2002) argued issues of “fuel poverty” were not 
eliminated. Our previous results for stated preferences in Table 1 showed the absence of 
significant relationships between these variables and price dissatisfaction. It follows that they 
are also not related to P and V, the two elements into which price dissatisfaction can be 
decomposed. In this case, the estimated effects of variables representative of vulnerability on 
spending on electricity can be interpreted, as those related to the control variables, mainly as a 
result of the differences in the amount of service consumed (X). As an exception, the elderly 
in Spain were observed to be more dissatisfied with electricity prices, corresponding to their 
higher spending on the service. 
 
For telecommunications, those variables associated with consumer vulnerability, already 
shown to be significantly related to price dissatisfaction, were also seen to be related, in 
general, to spending. In both countries, the elderly spend more on telephone services: 
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disaggregating this, they spend much more on fixed telephony, much less on mobile 
telephony and even less on internet services. Thus, controlling for income, employment 
status, education, household size and so forth, the elderly use fixed telephony services more 
intensively, rather than using alternative communications services. This behaviour would 
seem to be best explained by inter-generational lags and inertia vis-à-vis the take-up of the 
new technologies, reinforcing evidence of consumer heterogeneity. Elderly people’s 
dissatisfaction with these two services is linked to their lack of participation in these markets: 
many may use fixed telephony to make expensive connections to mobile telephones, for 
instance. For sure, their spending decisions do not lead them to optimise their savings, thus 
minimise their own dissatisfaction.  
 
As regards employment status, those households with no employed member and, to a lesser 
extent, households with one employed member, spend less on telecommunications in both 
countries, which can be explained by their negative perceptions about affordability. Finally, 
with regard to education, lower levels of education are associated with lower spending on 
telecommunications in Spain, though not in the UK. Simultaneously observed higher levels of 
dissatisfaction and lower spending on telecommunications among the household with no 
employed members, and, in Spain, also among the lower-educated, are interpreted necessarily 
as being derived from a more pessimistic perception (V) and/or lower amount consumed of 
the service (X), apart from possible differences in the unit price (P). Consequently, the 
combined evidence indicates that citizens face problems in the telecommunications markets, 
reflected in lower confidence (linked to the higher V) and/or lower participation (related to the 
lower X). In the case of lower-educated in the UK, the problems reflected by higher 
dissatisfaction can be interpreted as being derived from V, although differences may also exist 
in P and X. 
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Table 2. Effects estimated on spending on electricity and telecommunications 
  Electricity Telecommunications 
    UK Spain UK Spain 
    Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
  Constant term -0,909* -2,170*** -0,352 -3,900*** 
Employment ONEEMPLOYED -0,002 0,031 -0,158*** -0,157*** 
  NONEEMPLOYED -0,123 0,160*** -0,447*** -0,325*** 
Age RP <35 -0,016 -0,115*** -0,013 0,044 
  RP 50-64 0,435*** 0,073*** 0,030 0,220*** 
  RP 65-74 0,759*** 0,114*** 0,148* 0,227*** 
  RP >74 1,002*** 0,105** 0,270*** 0,243*** 
Education RP HIGHSECOND 0,076 -0,057** -0,010 0,132*** 
  RP UNIVERSITY 0,187*** -0,137*** 0,018 0,171*** 
Control NMEMBERS 0,221*** 0,365*** 0,353*** 0,508*** 
variables NMEMBERS2 -0,004 -0,023*** -0,022*** -0,033*** 
  NOHOUSEPROP -0,784*** -0,281*** -0,159*** -0,156*** 
  lnSPENDequiv 0,613*** 0,757*** 0,616*** 0,932*** 
N   6645 19435 6645 19435 
F   52,97 387.65 85,09 369,80 
Prob > F   0 0 0 0 
RP = Reference Person         
* Significance level at 10%, ** significance level at 5%, *** significance level at 1% 
Source: Own calculations based on INE (2006) and ONS (2006). 
5. Conclusions 
Results obtained are now applied to address the three hypotheses. The first stated that those 
citizens more potentially vulnerable as consumers would express higher levels of 
dissatisfaction with these services. In the case of telecommunications, it was shown that 
those not working, the elderly and the lower-educated, were indeed more dissatisfied with 
prices. Our findings coincide with the study by Bacchiocchi, Florio and Gambaro (2008) 
on satisfaction with fixed telephony in the EU-15 between 2000 and 2004, the main 
difference being that, in our contribution, mobile and internet communications were also 
included. Including these two new technologies turned out to be important, as some of the 
most vulnerable of consumers, the very elderly, are sharply dissatisfied particularly with 
them. It seems that a combination of issues including affordability but also inter-
generational difference help explain greater reluctance to use these new communications 
services. In contrast, for electricity, no significant associations were found between 
vulnerable consumers and price dissatisfaction in the two countries selected in 2006. Other 
research, such as Fiorio and Florio (2008), had found that the unemployed and less-
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educated were more dissatisfied with electricity prices, whilst the very elderly were more 
satisfied, in the EU-15 over the period 2000 to 2004.  
 
The second hypothesis posited that those more vulnerable as consumers would make 
different spending decisions than other citizens. On contrasting stated and revealed 
preferences, different interpretations can be derived from the evidence. For 
telecommunications, the most vulnerable citizens expressed high levels of dissatisfaction 
which was associated with their different spending decisions. In the cases of those who do 
not work and lower-educated people, high dissatisfaction is related to their lower levels of 
confidence and/or lower participation in the market. As regards the elderly, this category 
reveals differences when taking decisions about spending on mobile and internet 
communications. Decisions to spend instead on more on traditional, fixed telephony are 
associated with their high dissatisfaction levels with the alternative services. In contrast, for 
electricity, the differences observed are derived, in general, from differences in the amount 
consumed, as there are very few significant effects on dissatisfaction with the price. 
Finally, in relation to the third hypothesis, which posited that the problems exhibited by 
people in socio-economic categories associated with vulnerability would be similar across 
the two countries, this was found to be generally correct for telecommunications, whereas 
the evidence on electricity was more heterogeneous.    
 
The findings reinforce a basic observation: common policy reforms and regulation can 
have different effects on citizens, as they are heterogeneous, and do not necessarily behave 
in a uniform and rational manner. On entering the market, individuals do not have the same 
capacity or social environment to enable them to maximize their satisfaction. Citizens, as 
suggested by institutionalists, have different social, cultural and cognitive backgrounds. 
They are conditioned by their different social and relational environments, and this 
influences the processes of decision-making. Certain socio-economic groups, therefore, 
may be particularly vulnerable as consumers. 
 
The findings are significant from the perspective of policy-makers. Public infrastructure 
service reform and regulation were designed from the supply-side, and little or no attention 
was paid to citizens’ heterogeneity as consumers. The central issue is that, in the absence of 
compensatory regulatory policies, these reforms can have a negative impact on public 
service obligations, including issues of service universality and affordability. Worse still, it 
is, in general, those individuals who are potentially vulnerable in the market who may find 
their vulnerability increases. Given the EC holds that services such as electricity and 
telecommunications are key to ensuring equity, solidarity and social cohesion (EC 2007a), 
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the task of enquiring how reform of these sectors affects certain socio-economic groups 
associated with consumer vulnerability is an important one for the future evolution of 
public policy in the European Union.  
 
Two final observations are made. Firstly, findings obtained reaffirm the need to continue to 
redefine EC regulatory policies in these sectors, particularly by incorporating better 
insights on consumer heterogeneity in the design, implementation and evaluation of policy. 
Already, in recognition of the emergence of new issues as a consequence of the reform of 
public infrastructure services, some new regulation and programs have been implemented 
by governments and firms targeting consumers in particular socio-economic groups. In the 
UK, in the electricity sector, the electricity and gas regulator, OFGEM, launched a “Social 
Action Strategy” from 2000, in response to emerging evidence on problems such as 
unaffordable energy prices to the most vulnerable (OFGEM 2010). The British government 
has offered “Cold Weather Payments” during periods of particularly cold weather for those 
on low incomes. In the telecommunications sector, the ex-incumbent, BT, launched a 
service called “BT basic” from 2008, offering low-cost rental lines with restricted calls, to 
the unemployed and pensioners. In Spain, the National Commission of Energy (CNE) 
offered, in 2010, a “social voucher” to consumers considered vulnerable, effectively 
maintaining 2009 prices, whilst they increased by 10 per cent for the rest of the population 
(CNE 2010). A “social voucher” was also established by the Telecommunications Market 
Commission (CMT 2010) for the lowest-income pensioners from 2007. Telefónica, Spain’s 
ex-incumbent, also offered discounts on mobile telephone bills to the unemployed during 
2009 and 2010, with the aim these consumers would continue to use the service during the 
crisis (discontinued in October 2010). Secondly, it can be envisaged that the problems 
vulnerable consumers face in the public infrastructure markets will increase. 
Telecommunications, where the clearest evidence was seen on higher rates of 
dissatisfaction associated with vulnerable consumers, is also the sector where reform has 
most advanced. It is possible that, as reform has advanced in electricity, gas, water and so 
on, beyond the year analysed here, 2006, similar issues will be reinforced. Future lines of 
research could evaluate to what extent these new regulatory policies and social 
programmes succeed in ameliorating the way in which public infrastructure reform has 
appeared to have negative effects on the most vulnerable of consumers. 
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